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JUDGMENT-DECISION FOR THE MASTER AS A BAR TO SUIT
AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE-JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS AS

RES ADJUDICATA.-This is an action for damages for injuries sus-

tained by the plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant, an employee of the state. Plaintiff had previously sued the state
in the Court of Claims,1 where judgment was rendered in favor of
the state, on the grounds that the employee was not negligent and

that the plaintiff was negligent. This was affirmed by the Appellate
Division.2 Subsequently, plaintiff brought this action in the Supreme
Court, where the defendant-employee received judgment on the pleadings. On appeal to the Appellate Division, held, one judge dissenting,
affirmed. A judgment of the Appellate Division, affirming a judgment of the Court of Claims, dismissing on the merits a motorist's
claim for damages allegedly caused by a state employee's negligence,
is res adjudicata and estops the motorist from maintaining a subsequent action against the state employee based on the same grounds
of negligence. Jones v. Young, 257 App. Div. 563, 14 N. Y. S. (2d)
84 (3d Dept. 1939).
Under the doctrine of res adjudicata,an existing final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions on the points in issue 3

Where the action against the master

is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior,the master and servant are considered in privity.
The master's liability in such an action is not that of a joint tort
feasor, but is predicated only upon the negligence of the servant.4
There is really only one action, 5 and the plaintiff, having elected to
bring his action against the master alone, has had his day in court,0
and cannot re-try the same issues, namely, the servant's negligence
and his (plaintiff's) freedom from contributory negligence. 7
In the instant case, the state and the defendant are in privity
under a master and servant relationship,8 and under similar circumI Claim Number 24192.
2 Jones v. State, 256 App. Div. 856, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 774 (3d Dept. 1939).
3
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed.) 1322. See Gugel v. Hiscox, 216 N. Y.

145, 110 N. E. 499 (1915); Cristopher v. Sisk, 133 Md. 51, 104 Atl. 355 (1918).
4 Lasher v. McAdam, 125 Misc. 685, 211 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1925), aff'd,
217 App. Div. 718, 215 N. Y. Supp. 876 (4th Dept. 1926).
5 Wolf v. Kenyon, 242 App. Div. 116, 273 N. Y. Supp. 170 (3d Dept. 1934).
6Featherstone v. Newburgh & C. Turnpike Road, 71 Hun 109, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 603 (1893).
. 7Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N. Y. 228, 105 N. E. 423 (1914) ; Hein
v. Sulsberger & Sons Co. of America, 175 App. Div. 465, 163 N. Y. Supp. 995
(4th Dept. 1916). See Jepson v. International R. R., 80 Misc. 247, 140 N. Y.
Supp. 941 (1913), aff'd, 163 App. Div. 933, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (4th Dept.
1914), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 731, 116 N. E. 1053 (1917); Chicago & R I. R. R. v.
Hutchins, 34 I1. 108 (1863); Hardy v. Miller, 131 Kan. 65, 289 Pac. 952
(1930); Krolick v. Curry, 148 Mich. 214, 111 N. W. 761 (1907); Emery v.
Fowler, 39 Me. 326 (1855).
8 Jones v. State, 256 App. Div. 856, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 774 (3d Dept. 1939).
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stances, if the master were a private individual or corporation and
had been sued in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff would be 9barred
from maintaining this subsequent action against the employee. Nor
should there be a different result because the master here was the
State of New York, and so could only be sued in the Court of Claims.
By constitutional provision the Legislature is authorized to create
0
a court or board to hear and audit claims against the state.' A Court
of Claims is provided for by statute," and it has been made a court
of record 12 with an official seal.' 3 This court may promulgate, where
necessary, its own rules and regulations as to practice before it, but
it is provided that generally the practice should be the same as in the
Supreme Court.14 Determinations of the Court of Claims are made
by judgment, 15 and a transcript of a judgment in favor of the state
may be filed and docketed in the clerk's office in any county, and
where so docketed it will be a lien on property of the claimant in that
county to the same extent, and enforceable by execution in the same
manner, as a judgment of the Supreme Court.16 The judgments of
the Court of Claims may be appealed by either party to the Appellate
Division, generally under the same provisions of the Civil Practice
Act as apply to appeals from the Supreme Court,1T and a final determination against the claimant will forever bar any further claim or
demand against the state arising out of the matters involved in the
controversy.' 8 The court has jurisdiction to hear and determine private claims against the state,' 9 and by an amendment in 1936,20 the
state has waived its immunity, and has consented to have its liability
for the damages due to injury to property or for personal injuries
caused by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers and employees
of the state while acting as such, determined by the Court of Claims'
in accordance with the same rules of law as apply in actions in the
Supreme Court against private persons.
2
Thus, the Court of Claims is more than a mere auditing board, '
22
and the final decisions of such board, as well as the judgments of
) See notes 3 to 7, supra.
N. Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 23.
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21 See dissenting opinion of Justice Luce, instant case at

568, 14 N. Y. S.

(2d) 87 (1939).

22 Barber v. Town of New Scotland, 64 App. Div. 229, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1052
(3d Dept. 1901) ; Dufton v. Daniels, 190 Cal. 577, 213 Pac. 949 (1923) ; State

v. Knudsten, 121 Neb. 270, 236 N. W. 696 (1931); Little v. Board of Adjustment of City of Raleigh, 195 N. C. 793, 143 S.E. 827 (1928); City of Socorro
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the United States Court of Claims, 2 3 have been held to be res
adjudicata. Therefore, we have a court of record, very similar to the
Supreme Court, and an appellate court, both having jurisdiction over
the action and acting judicially, rendering final decisions dismissing
the claim on the merits, and fully and finally determining the identical issues that are again presented in this action. The plaintiff has
had his opportunity to prove his contentions 24 and so, on principle
and on precedent, should not be permitted to try the identical issues
twice.
A.A.

MORTGAGE

PARTICIPATION

CERTIFICATEs.-A

guarantee com-

pany owned a $42,300 mortgage and sold participating certificates
therein, amounting to $40,475 to third parties, guaranteeing payment
of principal and interest. It repurchased one $100 certificate and at
all times retained an interest of $1,825 in the mortgage. The company
is now in liquidation and the plaintiff, as liquidator, seeks to determine
whether he is entitled to share -pro rata with the third parties, in the
proceeds of the mortgaged property. Held, two judges dissenting,
judgment in favor of plaintiff reversed. The guarantee company
issuing the certificates is notentitled to participate in the proceeds of
the mortgaged property-until all other holders of similar certificates
have been. paid in full. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d)
724 (1939).
.
. The problem of the priority of rights in the. distribution of the
proceeds of guaranteed mortgage certificate issues. of companies now
in liquidation has arisen in numerous instances between the certificate holders and the company' and the instant case is another example
of a situation where the company owns an equity represented by an
unsold portion of the mortgage and by a repurchased certificate.
It is well settled that a mortgagee who assigns an interest in his
mortgage does not, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
postpone his interest to that of his assignee. 2 To establish priority
v. Cook, 24 N. M. 202, 173 Pac. 682 (1918); State v. Howard, 83 Vt. 6, 74
Atl. 2392 (1909) ; see FREEMAN, JUDGMENs (5th ed.) §§ 633, 1258.
3 United States v. O'Grady, 22 Wall. 641. (U: S. 1875).

24 Nor can plaintiff's contention, that h6 has been deprived of a jury trial,
be upheld. When a plaintiff has at his disposal two forms of actions or two
tribunals in which to commence it, and he elects the one which does not permit
him a jury trial, he is bound by his election and he"is estopped from complaining
about it later. See Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N. E.
993 (1917) ; In re Pickard, 140 Misc. 541, 250 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1931).
1 N. Y. L. J., June 14, 1938, p. 2866, col. 1.
2 Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467, 477, 4 N. E. (2d) 830, 835 (1936);
Mechanics Bank v. Bank of Niagara, 9 Wend. 410 (N. Y. 1832); Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415, 7 N. E. (2d) 841
(1937).

